In the past several years, however, political and economic developments in the United States have placed the pluralist paradigm under a good deal of strain. Even inside the pluralist school, serious doubts have arisen about the theory's ability to explain the American system. Strong doubts have arisen, too, about the relationship between pluralism and such central issues of democratic theory as equality, distributive justice, and peaceful social change. If Kuhn (1962, p. 52) is right that scientific understanding advances when old paradigms are supplanted by new theories that are thought to be better able to account for strategically important facts, it may be time to begin the search for a theory that is better than pluralism at explaining class and group power in the United States. So, at any rate, is the suggestion of this article.
At one time, pluralism was a reasonably coherent theory whose claims appeared to many political scientists to be solidly supported by empirical research. Pluralism-what we shall call pluralism I-asserts that the American power structure is made up of many competing elites, not just one. Different elites with low elite overlap and lower classes (Polsby, 1980 , pp. 8-13). Additional complications are that much leading work on elite theory has been done not on local communities where pluralist research has often been concentrated, but on the national power structure. And although some elitists are fairly comfortable with class analysis (Domhoff, 1978, p. 140) , such a leading figure as C. Wright Mills takes pains to reject it (Mills, 1959, p. 277) .
Porous boundaries among the three theories, coupled with internal variations amqng those who may be identified with one of the three camps, make comparisons difficult (Nicholls, 1974) . But if these theories are to be useful in understanding the realities of power, it seems necessary to identify some propositions on which pluralists tend to agree, and to critique these propositions from opposing perspectives.
'From here on, polyarchy will not be placed in quotation marks, but this does not mean that I accept it as an accurate description of the American system. Polyarchy is a term that contains descriptive and evaluative meanings that are, at best, highly problematic when applied to American political economy. gate, persistent inflation and unemployment, the forced retrenchment of the so-called welfare state, and the deepening of gross inequalities have moved such leading pluralists as Dahl and Lindblom so far to the "left" that scholars now talk of something called "neo" or "postpluralism." That pluralism stands in need of revision causes no surprise. No theory as closely tied to the system as pluralism could be unaffected by that system's performance. But it must be asked, how far "left" can pluralism go without exposing the need for a new, nonpluralist theory that may better fit the realities of political and economic power in the United States?
As measured by pluralism's own values, not just Marx's, the performance of the American political economy has been so poor that the theory of pluralism, in an effort to adapt, has been thrown into confusion. The two men who probably did more than anyone else in the past 30 years to modernize the theory of pluralism, Dahl and Lindblom, have been so disturbed by the system's performance that they have issued radical-sounding calls for major structural reforms and redistribution of wealth and income, and have even questioned the capitalist system itself. The problem, from the theoretical point of view, is that these changes in pluralism-which are so extensive that one may now distinguish between pluralism I and pluralism II-clash with previously received wisdom about the nature and legitimacy of power in America. As a result, pluralism II now calls into serious question much of what generations of American political scientists have taught and believed is true about pluralist democracy in the United States.
In exploring these issues, I will focus mainly on the recent work of Dahl and Lindblom, beginning with their extended 1976 introduction to Politics, Economics and Welfare. The appearance of this joint essay marks a turning point in the history of contemporary pluralist thought. In this work, Dahl and Lindblom set forth in summary form a number of critical revisions in pluralism that recur throughout their subsequent work. Lindblom expanded on these ideas in his award-winning Politics and Markets (1977) , and in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association (1982). Dahl's major contributions include essays published in diverse sources during 1977-1979 and, most important, his book Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (1982) . From these sources I construct and criticize the pluralist II theory of American polyarchy.
A second important caveat is that the following critique relies more on the class perspective than elitism. The pluralist-elitist debate has received so much attention ( This is not to argue that "class" differences are unimportant. It is to say that economic class is only one factor, often less important than others that can and quite evidently do yield distinct subcultures-ways of life, outlooks, norms, identification, loyalties, organizations, social structures.
Pluralism has traditionally downplayed class, but there is a related and equally important difference between pluralism and class analysis. These theories have historically been caught up in the battle between socialism and capitalism that has raged since the mid-nineteenth century. Social scientists, however much they may claim valueneutrality in their work, can hardly deny the political implications of a position that denies either the existence or importance of social classes. If classes in capitalist society are so fragmented that the concept of class is of doubtful analytical utility, then the Marxian analysis and critique of capitalism are seriously undermined. If, on the other hand, class is found to be of prime significance, the work of Marx, and the corresponding socialist critique of capitalism, take on added force. As a theory of how society works, pluralism may claim that all it does is report, not evaluate, the facts. In sharp contrast, class analysis openly deplores the facts it considers of paramount importance to understanding capitalist society. Whatever one's position on the possibility of value-free social research, however, there is no "Private ownership and control is but one form among a vast variety of alternatives" (p. xxvii).
"For reasons we develop in the book, the problem of control must be considered as prior to the problem of ownership" (p. xxix).
"To democratize the American polyarchy further will require a redistribution of wealth and income" (p. xxxii).
"Because governments respond more to the better-off than to the worse-off, they help to sustain the cycles of political effectiveness and ins effectuality that in turn perpetuate the structures of inequalities" (p. xxxvi).
"Businessmen play a distinctive role in polyarchal politics that is qualitatively different from that of any interest group. It is also much more powerful than an interest-group role" (p. xxxvi).
"Yet common interpretations that depict the American or any other market-oriented system as a competition among interest groups are seriously in error for their failure to take account of the distinctive privileged position of businessmen in politics" (p. xxxvii).
"An evident feature of the consensus prevailing in all the polyarchies is that it endorses attitudes, values, institutions, and policies of more benefit to the already favored groups in the society than to the less favored" (p. xxxviii). "In the United States more money, energy, and organizational strength is thrown into obstructing equality than into achieving it, more into constraining our liberties than into enlarging them, and more into maintaining the corporate domain as a private preserve than into making its public acts public" (p. xl).
"It follows from all we have said that we believe that major structural reforms are required in the American politico-economic system" (p. xli).
That Dahl and Lindblom decry the "incapacities" and even the "perversities" of American polyarchy because, even after years of opportunity, it failed to live up to their expectations of progress on economic and social equality. They charge that the politico-economic system "remains both sluggish and feckless in advancing on problems on which it has the advantage of decades of experience in policy making: poverty and maldistribution of income and wealth, racial inequality, health care, public education, inflation and unemployment, and industrial relations, for example" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976 , p. xxi).
But unless one assumes that capitalist polyarchy in time will advance equality to a significant extent, there is no reason for surprise (or lamentation) at its failure to do so. Class analysis and, to a lesser extent, elitism see the maintenance of inequality under capitalism not as a failure of polyarchy-not an incapacity or even a perversitybut as the whole point. Only liberal reformers lament polyarchy's failure to promote equality. Conservatives oppose most such efforts, whereas those on the left see government as part of a larger problem, the political economy of capitalism.
Herein may lie part of the key to understanding why pluralism II is not as radical a departure from pluralism I as it might at first appear. The critical quotes from Dahl and Lindblom, all of which express part of what they believe, are held in tandem with a logically incompatible set of ideas. Only out of complete context is pluralism II consistent with such radical ideas as major structural reform, redistribution of wealth and income, and substantive equality. Grave shortcomings of polyarchy are noted, to be sure. Once-sacred cows, including free enterprise, are seriously questioned. But pluralism still holds that the system's gaps and omissions and downright failures can be corrected without specifying how much structural change or redistribution of wealth and income are needed. The system needs major structural reform, to be sure, but, as we shall see, major structural reform does not mean basic alterations in class structure or class power. Despite, an appeal by Dahl and Lindblom for "Marxist humanists" to join pluralists in a united front behind the integrity of autonomous groups, pluralism remains profoundly at odds with class analysis. Endorsement of such socialistic-sounding proposals as redistribution of wealth and income seems to close the gap, but this is illusory. A closer look indicates that the theories are, on balance, far apart on most essential questions. Pluralism and class analysis, it appears, cannot be logically integrated without great distortion in the substantive integrity of both theories.
To explore this theme it will be useful to examine first the issue of social vs. private ownership and control of property. Class analysis and pluralism are then shown to clash, as always, over the question of equality. Pluralist political theory and a capitalist economy, it is argued, are more consistent with social inequality than equality. When coupled with the contradiction between pluralism's attachment to incremental change and the call for major structural reforms, this contradiction exposes the incompatibilities that still divide the two theories. In the final analysis, I argue, Dahl and Lindblom try to resolve the contradictions of pluralist theory by supporting increased incremental changes in a system with essential structural inequalities-inequalities that they themselves increasingly realize.
Capitalism vs. Socialism
Dahl and Lindblom's reconciliation of a socialist economy with pluralist democracy is rooted in their view of the limited nature of private property rights. As they see it, the economy should be thought of as a social or public economy. This shifts the primary justification of the economy from rights that inhere in private property to demonstrated economic performance in achieving social or public ends. From here it is but a hop to the view that private ownership and control is merely one form among a large variety of alternatives, and that this alternative has no defensible presumption that is qualitatively superior to public ownership and control. "Enterprises and markets are not justified by overriding personal rights to private ownership and control," they write. "If they are justified at all, it is only by their performance in achieving social ends" (1976, p. xxvii; see also Dahl, 1979b It is an arresting fact that even today in every country governed by polyarchy the means of production are for the most part owned "privately." Conversely, no country where the means of production are owned mainly by the state or (as under the Yugoslav constitution) by "society" is governed by polyarchy (1982, p. 108, italics his).
But is there a necessary relationship between pluralist democracy and capitalism?
Dahl's answer turns on the lack of a relationship between private ownership and control in an age of corporate capitalism. To sum up his argument: If, in the past, ownership meant control, this has changed. Large corporations are controlled by managers, not owners, and such corporations are inherently not private; they are social and political enterprises. They are social because they depend on joint actions that cannot be attributed to specific persons (and certainly not to stockholders), and they are political because they have great power over the lives of people. On the basis of this reasoning, Dahl (1982 Although this defense undoubtedly has great ideological strength, it is badly flawed theoretically. For the justification of private property as a natural, inalienable, or fundamental right provides scant justification for the existing ownership and control of large corporations. Insofar as a right to property is justified by the principle that one is entitled to use the products of one's own labor as one chooses, then surely the privileged position of stockholders is unjustified. On this principle, indeed, the employees would have an even more fundamental claim to own and control the firm for which they labor (1982, p. 201).
Dahl's emphasis on the public nature of corporations is crucial. In his view, the effects of corporations are so public, and the control of private owners so minimal compared to managers, that corporations should be thought of-defined aspublic entities, not private. From the perspective of class analysis, however, Dahl's treatment of capitalist political economy suffers a fatal defect: it fails to give classes their due. This is no small omission if your theory puts a profit-making class at the center of its analysis, sees profit-making as inextricably linked to ownership rights under capitalist social relations, and sees the essential driving force in capitalismthe pivot around which all else turns-as the production of profits. Just because most owners no longer directly run corporations does not mean they no longer control (on issues that count) those who do. Dahl's argument rests on the separation of ownership from control, but class analysis calls attention to return on owner equity as the allpervasive bottom line of capitalism. As long as the system hinges on profit, capitalist owners cannot be cashiered because they do not rule corporations directly; to do so mistakes subtle, indirect power and control with their absence. If owners call the tune, they control the system even though they may not manage it. There is, of course, no doubt that the results of private enterprise are vastly important to the public. Economic enterprises, whether publicly or privately owned, are properly thought of as political systems. But it is a rather large leap from these observations to the view that the economy is a public economy whose performance is to be judged by social effects. By simply asserting the public character of the economy, pluralism II virtually redefines the private enterprise system into a public enterprise system. In a flash, large chunks of the American economy are "collectivized," by definition.
Capitalist owners and managers might well object to such treatment. A class approach to the study of capitalist political economy would never conclude that private ownership and control is but one among many alternative economic forms. Class analyses of capitalism begin with people who own private property and the means of production, who employ lesser owners and nonowners to manage and produce goods and services for profit, and whose power to do so is grounded in government-enforced property rights. Private ownership and control in a capitalist system is not primarily a matter of social performance. It is primarily a matter of private profit. Capitalism is not impervious to social effects because the mass of the population is not without power. Capital and labor exist, after all, in a conflictual relationship in which capital, though by far the dominant power, is by no means omnipotent. Individual capitalists may be regulated and controlled or even expropriated if bad social effects generate enough danger to the overall system. But in general, private property rights and the profits that flow from them are not a form under capitalism; they are essential forms. Under capitalism the state does not exist to give effect to the rights of the public over private corporations. The state exists for the opposite purpose: to protect the rights of private property from unwanted intrusion by the nonowning public. This is what class analysis means when it asserts that the state is not merely a state in capitalist society, some sort of superstructure above the fray, but is rather a capitalist state. Dahl inverts these relationships and calls for rapprochement between pluralism and class analysis.
Class analysis has difficulty responding to the call because it sees the central political economic struggle under capitalism as the maintenance of private ownership and control and profit free from the public controls suggested by Dahl and Lindblom. This is seen, furthermore, in terms of class (not just group) struggle. Government is not free to intervene merely because a rational calculation might point to certain advantages of public control. The extent of such intervention is a hotly disputed matter. And as long as capitalism remains the dominant mode of production, the extent of public control is perforce limited. It is limited by, in the first instance, the power of capital, but it is also limited by the unexamined premises of a capitalist system, one of which is that government exists not as a foil to capital, but as guarantor. Class analysis thus challenges one of the fundamental presuppositions of pluralism: the impartiality of the state.
Such considerations are largely absent from pluralism's analysis of political economy. Rather than seeing private ownership and control as a structural feature of capitalism, pluralism tends to reduce such issues to matters of rational choice and public opinion. From a class perspective this runs the risk of trivializing the discussion. Characterizing their own approach to such questions as "non-doctrinaire" and "pragmatic," they assumed in 1953 that the comparative advantages of public ownership and control would lead to an increase in the public sector. But, again, they acknowledge they were wrong. Private enterprise "continues to give excessive weight to the particularistic interest of managers and investors in economic decisions of great importance to many others" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976 , p. xxix).
In follow-up studies, both Dahl and Lindblom extend their probing critique of capitalism (Dahl, 1982 , ch. 6; Lindblom, 1977, ch. 14). Had they given less weight to public opinion, however, they might not have been so surprised that the American public stuck with capitalism. For one thing, no choice between socialism and capitalism was offered the American people by the two major parties, both of which are firmly committed to capitalism. But more basic doubts can be raised over the assertion that the problem of control must be considered to precede the problem of ownership. Under capitalism, it is just the reverse. The essence of ownership is control, and just because it is indirect does not make it any less controlling.
Class analysis cannot consider such basic questions as ownership and control apart from the realization that the private stakes and power of a class are at risk in conflicts over public vs. private property. Dahl and Lindblom are no doubt aware of the high stakes involved in such questions, but such matters are not central to their analysis. In light of the formidable barriers to public control, it may be a bit excessive to place most of the blame on the American people for the lack of public control. Where there are addicts, there are pushers, and the power relationship between them must not be confused.
Absent a full appreciation for the structural relationships of capitalist political economy, pluralism II refers back to the American people and public opinion to explain why the system remains dominantly capitalist. Public opinion is thus treated as a major independent variable, and the thrust of the critique is directed at changing opinion through rational discourse, debate, and education.
A structural analysis recognizes that public opinion may have an effect under certain conditions, but, in the argot of political science, class analysts are inclined to view public opinion as a "dependent variable." Under a capitalist system there is no such thing as a free marketplace of ideas. Class analysis probes for the underlying causes of public opinion and locates them in the relationships among the classes and class fractions (groups) that constitute capitalist society. The liberal notion underlying public opinion, that ideas compete in a free marketplace and the best ideas win out, shifts the emphasis away from the structuralist insistence on the connection between interests and ideology. Objective interest and ideology may not coincide in all individuals, but in the social aggregate there is a strong tendency for ideology to be shaped in interaction with material life experience (praxis). When pluralists treat public, opinion as an independent variable, they reify ideas and opinion. Under capitalism, class analysis insists, some ideas are more free and equal than others, and in any event, ideas have limited independent effect. Class analysis sees capitalism as a political economy objectively rooted in unequal power based on the unequal private ownership and control of the necessary means of social production. Changes in capitalism must perforce raise questions of class conflict, not mere public opinion formation. By failing to take such considerations fully into account, Dahl and Lindblom have from the class perspective only weakly anchored their critical analysis of capitalism. As a necessary consequence, their call for reforms is likewise only loosely based, theoretically speaking.
The Pluralist Theory of Equality
Historically, pluralism and class analysis have clashed head-on over the issue of equality. Both theories endorse equality and present themselves as ways of attaining it, but this is possible only because they have meant radically different things by the term. Pluralist democracy, furthermore, pits equality as a value against a second great democratic value, liberty, and tends to see the two If the means of production are privately and unequally owned under capitalism, capitalism seems to be based on substantive economic inequality, from which flows, as Dahl admits, a certain level of political inequality. The only form of equality that is logically compatible with substantive inequality is equality of opportunity which, as Scharr (1967) and others have argued, is really the equal opportunity to become unequal. From Thomas Jefferson's defense of the natural aristocracy of talent, through social Darwinism's defense of the survival of the fittest, to presentday exaltations of individualism and competition, liberal democracy has consistently defended equal opportunity and the inequalities in the distribution of rewards that flow naturally from it. The question this raises is, of course: Can pluralist or liberal democracy be reconciled with class or socialist democracy if the two theories conflict so profoundly over the priority and meaning of equality?
The decisive shift of pluralism II is toward substantive equality and away from equal opportunity as the preferred democratic ideal. Having called for the redistribution of wealth and income, Dahl and Lindblom (1976) logically break the historical connection between capitalism and liberal democracy. They also partially correct pluralism's tendency to separate political and economic equality by noting that, "We cannot move closer to greater equality in access to political resources without greater equality in the distribution of, among other things, wealth and income" (p. xxxii). Dahl (1982, p. 117), writing separately a few years later, concludes that the "distribution of advantages and disadvantages is often arbitrary, capricious, unmerited, and unjust, and in virtually all advanced countries no longer tolerable. " It is so intolerable, in fact, that he has kind words to say for central government tax and transfer payments to reduce inequality, as long as individuals are free to spend as they choose.
There are, however, three major defects in pluralism's treatment of equality. First, pluralism has no clear criteria or standard for assessing what is just or unjust about the distribution of values in society. Second, pluralism treats public opinion as the explanation of inequality in the United States and as the vehicle for future egalitarian changes. Third, not all groups in the pluralist United States are equal, as pluralism grants in the privilegedposition-of-business argument, but the special place of business has not yet been fully integrated into a theory rooted in multiple, independent, and autonomous groups as the necessary building blocks of pluralist democracy.
Just and Unjust Distribution
Pluralism's discussion of equality is curiously indeterminate because pluralism lacks a clear principle or theory for assessing just and unjust distributions of wealth, income, and property. It lacks a theory of value. Consider the issue of political equality. Because political equality is obviously undermined to some degree by economic inequality, pluralism's call for redistribution makes good logical sense. But in the past, pluralism has not set equality of conditions as its goal. Without an underlying theory of value, it is impossible to assess clearly and logically why a particular distribution is just or unjust. "Inequalities in distribution are, of course, not inherently unjust" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxi) . In other words, inequality is not in principle bad; ceteris paribus, some inequality is in principle just. Inequality, then, is not a matter of principle but of pragmatics: the degree of inequality exceeds any principle of distributive justice Dahl and Lindblom find acceptable. They therefore deplore the gross level of inequality and call for (unspecified) egalitarian changes.
When Dahl and Lindblom endorse the redistribution of wealth and income, they endorse substantive equality, not mere equality of opportunity. When they endorse structural reforms, the suggestion is made that structural reforms should be made to promote substantive equality. But when they simultaneously argue that inequality is not unjust per se and do not confront the key issue of degrees of inequality, they cloud the case for equality. The flip side of the question of how much equality pluralism supports is how much inequality it is willing to tolerate. In Dahl's case the argument for redistribution and equality leads to a box canyon of an indefinite number of principles that might be used to allocate incomes, no Amdur, 1980) . A related problem with pluralism's treatment of equality is the theory's tendency, still, to separate political equality from economic equality, a separation which, for class analysis, makes little sense. Pluralism is quite clear that economic inequality frequently undermines political equality, but in Dahl's work, for all the apparent support for redistribution, the theory actually shies away from making an unequivocal endorsement. In his essay on liberal democracy, Dahl (1979a, pp. 65-66) rejects direct redistribution on grounds that it would require a major historical commitment to distributive justice, and such major changes are unlikely in the American system where intense minorities are powerful. These pragmatic objections, however valid, should not be allowed to mask the logical dilemma: if, as pluralism now grants, economic resources are often directly convertible into political resources, it seems to follow that political equality requires the redistribution of economic resources. Dahl, however, refuses to go this far. He prefers regulating the political effects of economic inequalities, a position that, at best, deals only indirectly with the problem. Regulating the political effects of economic inequality (e.g., by controlling campaign contributions) may promote equality indirectly, but it seems a major concession and a move away from pluralism II's seeming acceptance of greater substantive equality as a social goal.
How does class analysis approach equality under capitalist social relations? Such questions raise a host of complex issues that cannot be discussed here, but the starting point of any comparison would have to be Marx's audacious claim in volume 3 of Capital that he had uncovered the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure of capitalism, and with it the political form of the capitalist state. What was the key that could unlock so much knowledge? It was the relationship between capitalists and workers "in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers, land which] determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element" (Marx, 1967 , III, p. 791).
Marx was quick to recognize that although he saw the surplus-labor relationship as the key to understanding capitalism, the same economic base could give rise to infinite variation depending on innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, and racial relations, among other determinants. But the important point for this discussion is that Marx's claim points up a key difference between pluralism and class analysis: class analysis proceeds from an explicit theory of value; pluralism does not.
Marx anchors Capital in a theory of value for a very good reason. Without a theory of value, he was at a loss to present a principled attack on capitalism. He might personally deplore inequality, but he needed a theory of value to establish socialism as qualitatively superior to capitalism. His answer was the labor theory of value and, for all the debate that has surrounded that theory of value, at least he had one.
For Marx, concentrating on equality of distribution was a superficial level of analysis. No amount of reform in distribution could alter the fundamental inequality of capitalism: those who own the means of production stand in an exploitative relationship to those who don't. This was objectionable to Marx not primarily because everyone in society should have exactly the same wealth or income. Marx felt that bourgeois theories of distribution obscured the central issue of social class that underlies distribution; in effect such theories negate the one thing all commodities have in common: their origin in human labor power (Meek, 1956 
Public Opinion
A second problem with the pluralist treatment of equality is that, again, the problem is laid at the doorstep of the American people. Speaking of their call for a "fairer" share of income and wealth: "Until more Americans accept this view and act on it, the United States will not be the progressive society we wrongly assumed it to be at the time we wrote. Polyarchy may continue to exist at the present level, but democracy will still remain a long way off" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976 There are dangers in conceptualizing the problem in terms of public opinion. One danger is that one of the best known surveys on equality in America shows that the mass of the American people has been more supportive of economic equality than the elites (McClosky, 1964, p. 369) . But public opinion is notoriously volatile, and this is not the main point. Far more significant, from the class perspective,.is the unreality of relying on public opinion to advance equality. These are matters that, under capitalism, are systematically excluded from the American political arena. It is hardly the American people's fault that wealth and income are highly concentrated. Nor will public opinion necessarily bring about more equality. In a capitalist setting economic equality is not even a virtue, let alone a matter to be decided by public debate. The realization of equality requires fundamental changes in the system that makes inequality a virtue, a system strengthened, perhaps inadvertently, by theories of distributive justice which, in the name of equality, justify its opposite.
The Imperfect Balance of Group Power
If the level of equality is viewed as a structural feature of the political economy and not a matter of public opinion, what is the relationship between equality and another feature of the American system, the existence of groups? According to Dahl and Lindblom, social pluralism, defined as a diversity of autonomous social organizations, is a necessary condition of polyarchy. But pluralism sees two nagging flaws in polyarchy. First, not all groups are equal; not everyone organizes at the same rate, and power resources are not evenly distributed. Specifically, the better-off participate more. "As a consequence, government decisions reflect and reinforce a structure of inequalities" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. 
xxxvi). This pluralism acknowledges.
A related inegalitarian feature of polyarchy is the privileged position of business. Business is not just anther interest group. True, it plays a powerful interest-group role. But it also transcends such a limited role. As Dahl and Lindblom describe it, the American political economy is co-directed unequally by business and government, and in that order. Great public decisions are left to the market; government's job is to induce (not command) business to perform its functions. Pluralist theories that stress balance and countervailing power among interest groups, and fail to take into account the unique advantages enjoyed by business, are thereby impeached by Dahl and Lindblom.
Having thus arrived roughly at where Marx began, Dahl and Lindblom nevertheless continue to endorse the theory and practice of pluralism. Indeed, they even detect a lessening of antipathy toward pluralism among European "Marxist humanists" and suggest an emerging consensus on the need for autonomous groups as a bridge between the two opposing theoretical camps. As Dahl and Lindblom see it, the rigidly antipluralist Marxism of Stalin is on the way out, so the door is open to a reconciliation between pluralism and "Marxist humanism."
"But what about equality?" the skeptic may well ask. If even pluralists agree that business occupies a superior position in capitalism, if pluralists recognize that differential group power may act as an obstacle to democratization, and if pluralist politics tends to reflect and reinforce the advantages of the better-off, business-oriented groups may so impede equality that some centralizing, democratic, public force may be necessary to advance the egalitarian cause.
Dahl and Lindblom admit this possibility, but reject it. In fact, they offer no solution to the tension between unequal social pluralism and democratic equality, but they are clear about defending groups, and while rejecting one form of Marxism, they extend an olive branch to another. In their words, "Whatever the best solution to this problem (of equality) may be, for Americans, at least, it is not to be found, in our view, in destroying organizational autonomy and replacing autonomy with centralization, command, hierarchy, bureaucracy, and domination by an enlightened elite" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. xxxvi) .
Portraying the alternative to social pluralism as "domination by an enlightened elite" may not exhaust the possibilities, but it is less important here to debate the point than to note that pluralism II is as ideologically committed to social pluralism as was pluralism I. Pluralism puts considerable emphasis on the social and economic inequalities that Dahl is also troubled by the privileged position of business, but to date he has spent more time refuting the claim that pluralism contends that all groups are equal or substantially equal in power than in integrating the outstanding power of business into a pluralist framework. In his book, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, Dahl critiques the rather "absurd" claim that pluralists work on the assumption that each and every interest is equally capable of defending itself (1982, p. 207). But if it is true that pluralism has always recognized that not all groups are equal, it is also true that pluralism seems to require the assumption of at least some rough equality among groups for a system to be a polyarchy. Unless power is decentralized among many groups, pluralism is falsified, and some form of elite theory or class analysis better fits the empirical facts. The balance may be imperfect, but it is hard to see how pluralism can dispense with the notion of some sort of balance, some sort of rough parity or countervailing power, without sliding over into elite or class explanations of power. So far pluralism has not specified the parameters or levels of power distribution necessary for a system to be judged a pluralist democracy. But if business is as privileged and as powerful as pluralism now says, vexing questions are raised about the democratic character of capitalist regimes. Class analysis, of course, asserts that the power of business in-a capitalist system makes liberal democracy a contradiction in terms. On this point, as on so many others, the two theories stand so far apart that they are best seen as implacable opponents than as potential partners for a merger.
Structural Reform
One area of agreement between pluralism II and class analysis is the dismal performance of the American political economy in the past few decades. Both theories support major "structural" changes. But on close inspection, they mean very different things by structural reform. In fact, pluralism's call for structural reform is so conditional and narrowly defined that the two theories remain fundamentally divided over this question.
"Structural reform" is, of course, an idea closely associated with social democratic critiques of capitalism. The basic idea is that transformational changes can be made in capitalism to reduce or eliminate such serious capitalist "perversities" as inequality. The endorsement of structural reform apparently brings pluralism and class analysis, capitalism and socialism, closer together.
But here Dahl and Lindblom take a step that radically alters their course and demonstrates the continuing split between the two theories. It occurs when they question a feature of polyarchy with which they are prominently associated: incrementalism.
Having observed that "the (U.S.) distribution of income and wealth . . . remains pretty much where it was at the time we wrote (1953)," they at another point declare that "in most decades and in most of the polyarchies, incremental change has worked its effects over the distribution of income and wealth, property rights, corporate structure, industrial relations, social security, resource use, energy conservation, and international negotiation" (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976 issues," and which he says business normally keeps off the political agenda: the private enterprise system itself, a high degree of corporate autonomy, protection of the status quo on distribution of income and wealth, close consultation between business and government, restriction of union demands to those consistent with business profitability, among others (Lindblom, 1977, p. 205) . Pluralism now seems willing to place such issues on the political agenda, and this is indeed a change. But, again, unless pluralism faces squarely how much change in the private enterprise system or in the distribution of wealth is necessary to achieve such values as freedom and equality, the basic questions go begging. In contrast, class theory asserts a contradiction between Lindblom's grand issues and the general values for which pluralism and class analysis both stand. The pluralist position is much less clear. Pluralism now admits some connection between grand issues and general values, but is fuzzy about the crucial question of whether or not there is a contradiction, and how much change in the grand issues (e.g., private enterprise) is needed to promote the grand values (e.g., political equality). Class or structural analysis insists that the grand values cannot be attained within the confines of capitalism, pluralism either takes no such clearcut stand or affirms the opposite. This crucial difference, when added to class theory's insistence on nonincremental changes in class structure, and pluralism's clear preference for incremental changes not in class structure but in social institutions, clarify crucial differences between the two theories.
Clearly pluralism and class analysis mean very different things by the term "structural reform." Marxist class theory and even social democratic theories use the term to apply to changes in capitalism and the class structure embedded in capitalist social relations., In sharp contrast, recent pluralist theory does not address the question of class structure in contemplating structural reform. Indeed, pluralism contends that structural reforms may emanate from the market system that structural analysis means to transform. In assessing pluralism's call for structural reform, therefore, it is crucial to note the singular interpretation given the term. When pluralists propose structural reforms they are not talking about egalitarian changes in the class structure of American capitalist society. They are not talking about "phasing out" the capitalist class through redistributive taxes, controls on inheritance, or a levelling of work hierarchies and rewards. Major structural reform for Dahl and Lindblom means changes in the existing decision-making institutions of society; moreover such changes are to be brought about slowly through incrementalism. It is hard to see how class analysis and pluralism can be brought closer together unless and until they agree that such "grand issues" as the private enterprise system itself, and the class structure that goes with it, should not only be placed on the political agenda but resolved in such a way that nonincremental progress is made toward true substantive equality. (Nisbet, 1959) , for failing to offer a clear and consistent definition of class (Aron, 1950) , and for generally failing to appreciate the importance of cross-cutting cleavages in reducing class solidarity and class conflict (Dahl, 1982 , pp. 61-65) . Pluralism and class analysis remain split, therefore, over the basic unit of analysis for society. In pluralist theory, classes have merely a nominal existence compared to groups; in class analysis, groups are seen and analyzed as fractions or sub-parts of classes. Until some reconciliation of this conflict is offered, it is hard to see how class analysis and pluralism can be joined along the lines attempted by Dahl and Lindblom.
Summary and Conclusion
Pluralism II updates pluralist theory in light of such incapacities and perversities as Vietnam, Watergate, and persistent economic and political inequality. Despite an opening to the left, however, pluralism II remains a theory that is logically more compatible with, and supportive of, a capitalist political economy than a socialist one.
Class analysis and pluralism are profoundly split over equality (Dahl, 1979b; Green, 1979) . Pluralism now pays attention to the problem of economic and political inequality, but it falls short of endorsing full substantive equality as a social goal. As Bell has noted, the claim for equality of result is a socialist ethic, as equality of opportunity is the liberal ethic (Bell, 1972, p. 48) . Marxian socialism points toward substantive equality because it is rooted in a theory of value that stresses the collective involvement of all members of society in producing social goods. Pluralism lacks a clear theory of value, but its historic attachment to equality of opportunity seems to ensure the acceptance of more social inequality than is tolerable in class theory. This seems true, moreover, even if pluralism accepts Rawls's theory of distributive justice as its own. It bears repeating that the difference principle defends inequalities as just as long as they make everyone better off; it is not a straightforward argument for substantive equality. Pluralism I and II, then, despite the call (at least by Lindblom) for redistribution, seem more compatible with equality of opportunity than equality of results. Equal opportunity to compete in a race that necessarily results in a small number of winners and a large number of losers is Orwellian newspeak. It defends inequality in the name of equality (Scharr, 1967, p. 234) , and helps induce mass acquiescence in the perpetuation of an unequal social order. To the extent that pluralism does the same, it belies the espousal of substantive equality through the redistribution of wealth and income.
In the structural view, inequality under capitalism is not a by-product of the system that is amenable to polyarchal corrections. It is a structural imperative. It is one of the things that makes capitalism capitalism and distinguishes it from socialism. From the class perspective, inequality is as likely to be significantly reduced or eliminated under capitalism as the meek are to inherit the earth. The fundamental reason this is so is the essential, structural relationship between capital and labor in a capitalist society: they are, by definition, unequal. Perhaps Marx, who drew attention to this relationship with acid humor, should be allowed to speak here. He describes the root inequality, after the establishment of capitalism, this way:
He, who before, was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect but-a hiding (Marx, 1967 , I, p. 176).
It might be judged excessive to contend that pluralism is in danger of imploding from internal contradictions, but in light of the difficulties raised above, it might not be excessive to suggest that pluralist theory is in need of some clarification.
A class or structural analysis of American political economy seems more consistent with the fact of gross inequality in wealth, income, and power under capitalism. Capitalism makes a fetish of commodities, not equality. Indeed, it presumes unequal natural talents and abilities and rewards, and justifies them under the theory of equal opportunity. Pluralist theories would be more consistent if they dropped the untenable adherence to substantive equality and faced up to the reality of inequality in the system of which the theory of pluralism is an integral part. Class analysis not only conforms better to many of the empirical realities of American political economy, which saves it from wounded surprise over the system's performance, but it clearly and consistently adheres to egalitarian standards that flow from its analysis of the class structure of capitalism. If American social science means to explain better, let alone help change the American political economy, the pluralist-elitist debate might well
